E 

's 



SSSS^SkSwk^ 



-QJ. 






REPORT OF TIIR OrEIlATfONS 




MAJ.-GEN. FREMONT, 



IN COMMAND OF THE MOUNTAIN DErAllTMENT, 



DrnrxG rnK 



SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1802 



NEW YORK: 
BAKER A GODWIN, PRINTERS, 

PHINTING-IIOUSF. SQUARE. 

1800. 



I 







Glass _^ 



Ef^3 



TT 



REPORT OF THE OPERATIONS 



MAJ.-GEISr. FEEMONT, 



IN COMMAND OF THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT, 



DUaiNG THE 



SPRING AND SUI^IMER OF 1863. 



NEW YORK: 

BAKER & GODWIN, PRINTERS, 

PRINTIXG-HOUSE SQUARE. 

1866. 






CI 



REPORT. 



-*^-- 



Keav Yokk, X. Y., Dec. 31st., 1865. 

Brevet Beig.-General J. C. Keltok, 

AssT. Adgt.-Genekal, WAsnmaTox, D. C. 

Sir : I have had tJie honor to receive your commimicatioii 
of the 4th iiltiiiio, requesting a report of operations in the 
Mountain Department, during the period of my command, 
in 1862. 

Unavoidable engagements have interfered to prevent an 
earlier compliance with your request ; and having been specially 
ordered, shortly after I was relieved, to turn over to my suc- 
cessor all books, records, and documents, pertaining to the De- 
partment, I am also without the data necessary to complete 
and full statements. 

Under the order of the President, bearing date March 11, 
I proceeded to the designated Headquarters of my Department, 
AVheeling, Va., relieving Brigadier-General Rosecrans, and 
assuming command March 29, 1862. 

The disposition and numbers of troops, upon my arrival 
witliin the Department, were reported to me as follows : 

Within the District of the Cumberland, comprising all 
east of the Alleghanies and west of the Department of the 
Potomac — three regiments of infantry and one company of 
cavalry. The district commanded by Brigadier-General R. 0. 
Schenck, 



Within the Cheat Mountain District, comprieing all west 
of the Alleghanies, south of the railroad lines, north of the 
Yalley of the Gaiiley, and east of the AVestem and Summer- 
ville Koad— six regiments andhve companies of infantry, four 
companies of cavalry, and two batteries of artiUery. District 
under command of Brigadier-General E. H. Milroy. 

Within the Kailroad District, comprising all north and 
west of the railroad lines— thirty-four companies of infantry 
of different regiments, eight companies of cavalry, and three 
batteries of artillery. Brigadier-General B. F. Kelly com- 
manding. , . 

Within the District of the Kanawha, comprismg all the 
valleys of the Kanawha and Guyandotte Rivers, and mouth 
of the Big Sandy— twelve regiments and three companies of 
infantry, "fifteen companies of cavalry, and two batteries of 
artillery. District commanded by Brigadier-General J. D. 

Cox. J 1 /-. 

AVithin the Districts of Big Sandy Yalley and the Gap, 
commanded respectively by Colonels Garfield and Carter, 
were troops estimated in the total at a fraction over mne 

thousand men. 

The total of troops within the Departnjent as ascertamed 
or estimated, that is to say : Of infantry, thirty-five and two- 
tenths regiments ; of cavalry, thirty-six compames ; and ot 
artillery, nine batteries ; stood in figures at thirty-four thousand 
two hundred and seventy-one men (34,271). 

Shortly after assuming command I was informed by the 
Secretary of War that the troops in Eastern Kentucky and 
Southwestern Virginia, although included within the hmits 
of my Department, would not be subject to my command or 
control. This deducted, agreeably to the estimates turned 
over to nic, nine thousand one hundred and ninety-five men 
(9 195). Adding to these the percentage allowed in estimates 
as sick, &c., and not available for duty, a further decrease 
took place of six thousand two hundred and sixty-nine men 
(6,269), leaving balance of eighteen thousand eight hundred 
and seven (18,807) effective force. Say, in round numbers, 
nineteen tho isand men (19,000). 



With these troops it was necessary to guard a frontier of 
three liundred and fifty miles, approached by roads more 
or less at rectangles with lines in occupation, and having few 
interior cross-communications. They were also employed to 
guard the depots, bridges and tunnels on three hundred miles 
of railroad and over two hundred miles of water com- 
munication. Several partially-formed regiments and com- 
panies were found waiting at different localities on my arrival 
at Wheeling, and asked only to be mustered in and furnished 
with arms to do good and loyal service. Eecent orders, how- 
ever, of the War Department, concerning enlistments and the 
increase of regiments, forbade my acceptance of more than a 
limited proportion of these troops, and this proportion only as 
a remainder upon previous quotas of the State. By special 
permission, two howitzer batteries were afterward organized, 
but at a date so late as to compel a detail from troops already 
in service, to make up the rank and file, thus failing to 
increase the total of enlisted within the Department. 

The enemy, beginning already to gain strength by rein- 
forcements opposite the whole extent of my lines, was not 
hesitative in his demonstrations. Early in April, General 
Milroy, within the Cheat Mountain District, was attacked, 
near Monterey, by a force of over one thousand rebels, with 
cavalry and artillery. After a short engagement, the enemy 
were put to rout, and driven, with heavy loss, beyond the 
Shenandoah Mountain. At this point pursuit was restrained, 
partly owing to absence of supports, but mainly because of 
the want of horses to get forward artillery. 

Guerrillas also began to be active, and, later in the month, 
a small body of infantry, sent out by General Schenck from 
Romney, were attacked on Grass Lick, near Lost River. The 
skirmish was severe, our men losing several killed and wounded. 
A reinforcement of cavalry coming up, however, under Lieut.- 
Colonel Do^vney, of the Potomac Home Brigade, the rebels 
were driven and pursued, with the loss of their leader and 
others killed, besides a number wounded and captured. 

Still later, in April, an expedition of infantry and cavalry 
was sent out from Weston by Colonel Harris, of the Tenth 



Virginia, against guerrillas infesting Webster Comity. The 
cavahy, under Lieutenant Lawson, being attacked near Addi- 
son, after killing five of the enemy, fell back upon the infan- 
try, under Captain Darnall. A running tight then ensued, in 
Avhich the guerrillas were assailed in their own style. The 
skirmish continued for several hours, at the end of whicli time 
the bushwhackers wei'e routed, with tlie farther loss of twelve 
killed, several Avounded, and four or tive captured. The vil- 
lage of Addison, being deserted bj its original inhabitants, 
and found to be a rendezvous for the enemy, was burned. 
Some cattle and horses were also captured. The loss of Cap- 
tain Darnall's command was but three wounded in all. The 
lesson inflicted upon the guerrillas in this instance was severe, 
and induced their leader to send in a letter offering terms of 
compromise. 

Other affairs and skirmishes took place between detached 
parties of our troops and the guerrillas up to within the month 
of May. 

It was ascertained, that, under expectation of entii*e immu- 
nity, by virtue of commissions issued at this time broadcast by 
Governor Letcher, these irregular bands were drawing; together 
in considerable strength, and waited only for the coming ot 
the leaves to harass, with robbery and murd'er, our lines from 
right to left. As a preventive measure, certain of their class 
were, after fiill and fair trial by military commission, promj^tly 
executed by hanging. The effect was to correct a mistaken 
belief in impimity for their crimes, and to render more secm'e 
interior points and roads, as well as loyal inhabitants of the 
several military districts. 

In connection with the irregular, but often prolonged and 
severe contests with guerrillas, it is just to name Colonels 
Harris and Eathbone, of Virginia troops ; Lt.-Colonel Downey, 
of the Potomac Horse Brigade ; Captain Latham, of Ohio In- 
fantry ; and Captain Fish, of Connecticut Cavalry ; as sjDeeially 
active and s-uccessful. 

The troops of my command, however, though equal to the 
maintenance, foi' the time being, of lines established, w^re, 
owing to their necessarily scattered condition, unavailable, in 



any large proportion, to form active or movable columns, or 
for operations of a general cliai"acter against the enemy. In 
view of this fact, as also of a plan submitted for movements 
in the direction of Knoxville and the Yirginia and Tennessee 
Railroad, the President liad, prior to my leaving Washington, 
in March, promised me ample reinforcements. The number 
of these reinforcements, as determined and urged by t\\e 
Secretary of War, Avas seventeen thousand. They were to 
consist of infantry, cavalry, and ai'tillery, and to have at- 
tached a pontoon train complete. On the 1st of April, a 
despatcli from the Secretary of AVar informed me that the 
Division of Brigadier-General Blenker liad been detached 
from the Army of the Potomac, and put en route for my 
Department. Tlie order, as originally issued to this division, 
directed it to proceed by way of Harper's Ferry, and from 
that point rep(.)rt. As, however, up to the 12th of April, it 
had failed to reach Harper's Ferry, I telegraphed a request 
that it be ordered to move by the most direct and shortest 
road to Moorfield ; tliis arrangement suiting best my plans as 
up to the time developed. Brigadier-General Rosecrans, who, 
in the meantime, had been placed in temporary command to 
conduct the division, was accordingly instructed to the above 
effect. 

Next to the want of troops within my Department in 
numbers sufficient or available for extended operations, had 
been, as it continued to be, the absolute and pressing need of 
transportation. As early as the begmning of April no less 
than five batteries in the field were found to be without horses, 
and the case represented to the War Department. From want 
of horses, also, to get forward guns, at least one opportunity 
had been lost in the Cheat Mountain District to pursue and 
capture a retreating rebel force. The Sixth Ohio Cavalry, an 
excellent regiment, eager for service, was kept unmounted, 
and, by consequence inactive, for the sole reason that animals 
could not be obtained to supply it. Requisitions reported, 
made by my predecessor in command as early as February, 
for cavalry and artillery horses, mules, wagons, &c., had not 
been met. Requisitions made direct by myself, under special 



6 

j^ermisBion, lingered in nnknown channels, and that which 
was asked for was but partially obtained. Mj earnest and 
repeated requests for authority to order the purchase of ani- 
mals needed, M^thout delay, and in the open market, were not 
acceded to. It was replied that the mode of supply, through 
requisitions in the ordinary form, was " sufficient for all pur- 
poses, and the only mode consistent with a proper regard 
for public expenditure." Delays suffered were certainly re- 
markable, inasmuch as the Secretary of War constantly and 
kindly assured me that transportation had been or would be 
speedily ordered, through the proper department. 

The frequent and earnest dispatches of General Rosecrans 
also showed that the troops ordered to reinforce my Depart- 
ment were even worse off than my own, and difficulties in the 
way of rapid and efiicient operations at a distance from main 
points of supply were increafeed, instead of being diminished. 

Over forty horses were demanded by General Rosecrans 
to get the batteries of the Blenker Division out of Martins- 
burg. 

Thirty-six ambulances and teams were also called for. 
Forage was scarce, and animals already in hand reported 
" starving." In addition, it appeared, as late as April 19th, 
that so illy provided in other respects were the coming rein- 
forcements, that thirty-eight days had been passed by them 
without tents or other shelter, and this during tlie inclemencies 
of a spring seldom paralleled for severity in the history of the 
Virginia valleys. To obviate a delay in payments and an 
issue of clothing expected to be made, I directed my troops, 
as fast as cared for, to be sent forward by regiments or other 
sufficient bodies to Moorfield. After much correspondence, I 
had begun to think the difficulties of the Blenker Division at 
length removed, and was looking for their immediate appear- 
ance in the Department, wlien, finally, I was informed that 
the men were too badly in want of shoes to march. 

With things at this ebb, a dispatch from the Secretary of 
War, bearing date April 21st, stated the desire of the President 
to know at what time I purposed moving against Knoxvill^, 
and by what route. 



In I'eplv, I had the honor to submit for consideration, 
through my Chief of Staff", dispatched to "Washington for 
the purpose, the two separate plans set out in the following 
letter ; 

Headquarters MotraxArN Department, 
Wheeling, Va., April 21, 1865. 
To His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, 

President of the United, States. 

Sir : In answer to a telegram from the Secretary of Wai", desiring me 
to submit to the President my proposed plan of operations for the occupa- 
tion of Knoxville, I beg leave to state that my first intention was, after 
guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the loyal iuhal)itants of 
the Department with a force of about 10,000, to transjiort 25,000 men by 
railroad and the Ohio, to Maysville, Covington, and Louisville, Kentucky ; 
thence, partly by rail and partly by tumpike, to Nicholasville, and Irom 
that point march directly upon Kjioxville, tm-ning the enemy's position at 
Cumberland Gap. 

The difficulties, however, in the way of obtaining the requisite number 
of troops, have led to a change of my jilan, which is as follows : 

The first base of operations being the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 
the division of General Blenker, which, from the best infoi-mation I can 
obtain, numbers about 9,000 men, will take position atMoorfiold. At this 
point, or at Franklin, it ^vill imite with the troops now under command of 
General Schenck, numbering about 3,000. With these, acting in conjunc- 
tion with General Banks, I propose to move up the Valley of Virginia, by 
a course which you will see on the accompanying map, over roads which 
are as dry and good at all seasons of the year as any in Virginia, and 
thiough a country where forage is easily obtained. 

At Monterey I shall be joined by the troops under General Milroy, 
numbering thirty-five hundred eflective men, and can then strike the 
railroad at or near Salem, while General Cox, with his seven thousand 
men, takes possession of Newbem ; or can effect a junction with General 
Cox, and seize the railroad with a force thus increased to about twenty- 
two thousand. 

The base of operations vnll then be changed to Gauley. To this 
place, by the Ohio and Kanawha Rivers, abundant supplies for the army 
can be transported with the means now on hand and being prepared. 
Having thus destroyed the connection between Knoxville and the army in 
Eastern Virginia, and, perhaps, seized some rolling stock, we can advance 
rapidly along the railroad toward Knoxville, turning the position at 
Cumberland Gaf>. 

The forces now imder General Kelly and the Vii'ginia troops will be 
left as we proceed, to guard the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and to pro- 
tect the loyal inhabitants of the State from guenillas. The latter is 
to be effected hj the establishment of a few posts strongly held, from 
which sudden and frequent attacks can be made upon any organizations 
existing ©r forming in the Department. 

Knoxville taken, a thii'd base of operations can be made fi'om Nicholas- 
ville, from which place supplies can be easily obtained and tran^5ported 
over level and good roads. The army will thus be in a position to co- 
operate in any way in the general plan of operations for the prosecution 
of the war. 



The original plan, above mentioned, possesses the advantages of rapid- 
ity in execution, the throwing us forward immediately into the heart of 
the enemy's country, the striking of the enemy's railroad in the first ui- 
stance at the most important point, and a base of operations in a friendly 
coimtry, thi'ough which provisions can be drawn with comparative 
safety. The second has been suggested only because it enables us to 
collect the troops now scattered throughout the Department, and thus 
increase the small force sent. 

Respectfully, 

J. C. FREMONT, 

Maj.'Gen. Commanding. 

The jji-oposed plan of operations up the Valley of Virginia 
was approved by the President and Secretary of War, bnt, as 
subsequently indicated in telegrams from the War Depart- 
ment, it was adopted in view of the ultimate closing in of my 
cohmms toward Richmond rather than Knoxville. 

On the 3d of May, I moved with my staflf to ]Sew Creek, 
on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad — my proposed depot of 
main supply for operations in the field. On the 4th of May, 
I was apprised by the Secretary of War, of the evacuation 
of Yorktown by the rebel forces. Foreseeing by this event, 
and the release of so large a body in the East, that the enemy 
would be enabled to augment, westwardly, his force along my 
front, I judged it desirable to get forward and concentrate, at 
an early moment, my strongest available supports. 

Lea^nng New Creek on the 5th, and taking with me upon 
the route the Sixtieth Ohio, a portion of tlie Eighth Virginia, 
a compan}'^ of Indiana cavahy, and a body of men sent 
forward with baggage from Blenker's Division, I proceeded 
toward Petersburg, arriving on tlie evening of the 7th. 

General Schenck, who had been ordered early in April to 
advance from Romney and Moorfield to operate on the road 
leading by Elkhorn to Franklin, in connection witli move- 
ments with General Banks up the Shenandoah Valley, was 
already well in advance. Overcoming many obstacles in the 
form of swollen streams and difhcidt roads, he had, by the 
6 til of May, reached Franklin. Farther to the front, and 
occupying McDowell, a small village about twelve miles east 
from Monterey, was General Milroy. General Cox, in the 
District of the Kanawha, also under orders previously given, 



was moving in force in the direction of Lewisburg and Peters- 
town. The command of General Kelly, posted to gnard the 
Baltimore and Ohio Kailroad, as well as to Avatch and punish 
guerrillas, was necessai'ily left in rear. A small j^ortion of his 
force, however, from the Potomac Home Brigade, subse- 
quently reported to me at Petersburg, under Lieut.-Col. 
Downey. 

The Blenker Division, though ordered upon the 1st of 
April, had not so much as entered within the limits of my 
Department until the 4th or 5th of May. Taking into Aaew 
their ill-provided condition, as reported and set forth in the 
foregoing, their delay upon the route Avas less a matter of sur- 
prise with myself than had been expressed to me in dispatches 
from the War Department. Upon the Tth the brigade of 
General Stahel being reported at Ronmey, and still in need of 
shoes, a supply was ordered from New Creek. The issue was 
made while the men were upon the road — companies halting 
for the moment to receive what could be spared them. 

On the 9th of May the advance of General Blenker's 
Di-vision joined me at my camp near Petersburg, and by the 
11th his whole command had arrived. 

The division was composed of three brigades, commanded 
respectively by Generals Stahel and Bohlen and Colonel Stein- 
wehr. Assmning the data as then sent in, Gen. Blenker 
stated his effective force at over eight thousand. Subsequent 
investigation placed the number of men and officers actually 
present and fit for duty at considerably below seven thousand. 

The condition of the men, as exhibited upon review, was 
not such as could be desired. They were worn and exhausted 
by hardships scarcely credible, and, in spite of efforts by my- 
self and others to supply their wants, a large portion were 
without articles of first necessity for service in the field. Of 
shoes, blankets and overcoats, there was especially very great 
need. 

Wagon and artillery-teams, brought forward by the several 

batteries and regiments, were found, on inspection, to be very 

much jaded and weak from the long march and want of forage. 

The horses of a portion of the cavalry were so nearly starved 

2 



10 

and broken-down as to be well-nigh useless. The number of 
wagons was much below the standard for supply on any length- 
ened route. By report of the Medical Director, afterward 
sent in, but about one-fifth of the necessary ambulances had 
been brought along. One regiment had none. In the im- 
portant matter of arms there was great deficiency, Belgian or 
Austrian muskets, of old and indifferent patterns, being car- 
ried by many of the regiments. Having fortunately at hand 
a superior lot of Enfield rifles, I was enabled to re-arm the 
corps most needing them. Ammunition was also supplied, as 
far as resources would then permit. A pontoon train having 
been previously ordered from Pittsburg, upon my personal 
responsibility (though the Government afterward sanctioned 
the contract), and being already well upon its way to Peters- 
burg, it was of less moment that none was found attached to 
my reinforcing column. 

Restrictions upon my Chief Quartermaster at Wheeling 
having been at this time in a technical form removed, it was 
reported, in encouragement, that team and cavalry horses 
were coming freely in. These, together with wagons, harness, 
and other equipage, would be promptly forwarded. The Sixth 
Ohio Cavahy, having now the opportunity, procured their 
mount — joining by companies, according as they were furnish- 
ed and equipped. A battery of mountain howitzers for one 
of the companies heretofore alluded to as specially authorized, 
had also arrived at New Creek. Being brought forward as 
packed, with jsarriages, implements, and harness, they were, 
on the last night of my stay at Petersburg, mounted and 
made ready for the field. 

With a view to future service, a brigade of light troops 
was made up at Petersburg, consisting of the Sixtieth Ohio, 
Col. Trimble, and the Eighth Yirginia, under Major Oley. 
Col. Cluseret, of my staff*, a French oflicer of experience, and 
especially so in the tactics of skirmishers, was assigned to the 
command. 

In the meantime. Gen. Banks had been wdthdraAvn from 
his advanced position near Staunton, and my left became 
dangerously exposed. Seeing his advantage, the enemy 



11 

was not slow to profit by it. Turning promptly to the 
west, and, uniting with his own the forces of Johnson and 
Ewell, the rebel leader Jackson, upon the 7th of May, 
attacked the outposts of Gen. Milroy. The simultaneousness 
of his onset indeed, with the retirement of Banks, argues 
strongly that — by whatever means obtained — the rebel gene- 
ral had early information of the projected movement. On the 
8th of May, with an aggregate of upward of fourteen thousand 
men. and thirty pieces of artillery, Jackson advanced upon 
the main body of Gen. Milroy's force at McDowell. Push- 
jng forward, in a march of thirty-four miles in twenty-four 
hours, Gen. Schenck arrived from Franklin in time to unite 
with and support Milroy. An obstinate engagement took 
place. Official reports of the action were, at the time, sent in 
by me to the War Department. 

Under the leadership of their gallant commander, the men 
of Milroy's brigade repeatedly attacked and charged a greatly 
superior force, exhibiting a courage and tenacity worthy the 
highest praise. The Ohio troops behaved with equal gallantry, 
and suffered severely. After several hours of fighting, how- 
ever, our troops, outnumbered at every point, reluctantly 
yielded portions of the field to the odds fiowing in against 
them. The enemy's loss was over forty killed, and between 
two and three hundred wounded. Our loss was thirty-one 
killed and missing, and two hundred and seventeen wounded. 
Finding his position at McDowell untenable, and looking 
to the chances of a night attack. Gen. Schenck, now in com- 
mand, decided to withdraw toward Franklin. The retrograde 
was executed with skill and address, and, bringing safely off 
his trains, artillery and wounded. Gen. Schenck re-entered the 
above-named town on the 10th of May. Here, disposing hi^ 
troops to guard against farther advance of the enemy, he 
awaited the approach of reinforcements from Petersburg. 

Less than twenty-four hours' rest had been given to por- 
tions of the command arriving with Gen. Blenker, but deem- 
ing the situation of increased importance, I determined to 
move at once to the relief of Gen. Schenck. I was unable to 
carry forward with me necessary supplies, owing to the still 



12 

entirely inadequate transportation, but was obliged to rely 
npon renewed efforts at the rear to get forwa d in time what- 
ever should be most needed to sustain my troops. At four 
o'clock in the morning of the 12th my advance had forded the 
Slienandoah at Petersburg, and on the forenoon of the 14:th, 
after a camp of one night upon the route, I reached Franklin. 
Preferring to avoid any immediate encounter with my force as 
concentrated, Jackson, leaving temporarily a thin curtain of 
his people to disguise the movement, began an early retreat. 
By sundown of the 15th he had disappeared in a southeasterly 
direction from my front, taking the road toward Shenandoah 
Mountain. 

Although hitherto crippled for want of transportation, and 
wanting more than ever supplies of every description, I had 
reason to expect that with economy in the camp, as well as 
just eifort on the part of agencies elsewhere, deficiencies would 
yet be made good. Accordingly, for the ten days next follow- 
ing upon my arrival at Franklin, I addressed myself to the 
task of getting into order and condition my troops, as well as 
to details of the movements projected against Knoxville and 
the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. While thus occupied, I 
received from the Secretary of War the following urgent dis- 
patch, which made me still more deeplj'' regret the embarrass- 
ments of my situation : 

"Washington, May 16, 1862. 

Major- General Fremont, Franklin. 

TTie President desires to know whether you design to move on to the 
Virginia and Tennessee Raih'oad, and break it between Newbern and 
Salem, according to the plan you proposed and he approved ; and also 
whether, having reached and broken that road, you cannot move forward 
rapidly upon Richmond by that route ? And by what time you can reach 
the Railroad, and how long it will take you from there to reach Richmond 
Please answer immediately. 

E. M. STANTON, 

Secretary of War. 

In the meantime the campaign was being well carried 
forward. In execution of the plan upon my right, the opera- 
tions of General Cox were resulting in brilliant success. 
Moving forward as directed, with a view to reach and sever 



13 

the railroad, his fore 'acked at Lewisburg, May 23d, 

by a body of the enemy over mree thousand strong, under the 
rebel leader Heth. 

After an engagement of several hours, the enemy were 
routed, and fled in disorder from the field. Foiu- pieces of 
artillery were captm'ed by General Cox's troops, two hundred 
stands of small arms, and over one hundred prisoners. 

Our loss was ten killed and about forty woundedy^^j this 
brilliant aifair the conduct of Colonel Crooke's I?j.^^*„,. ^v'oear- 
ing the brunt of the attack, cannot be too high^/ praised. 

The rebel loss in killed and wounded^ ^a this action was 
also severe. ' 

But events were now taking place in another direction, 
which had the effect to terminate suddenly my proposed cam- 
paign, and divert my column, intended for Ivnoxviile, upon a 
line of march entirely new. 

The rebel General Jackson, quitting my front, and turning 
abruptly to the north into the Shenandoah Valley, had, with 
his customary impetuosity, attacked General Banks at Front 
Royal, pressing liim backward toward Strasburg and Win- 
chester, and tlireatening the whole valley of the Potomac. 

With the intelligence of these events, dispatched to me under 
date of May 24th, came also an order from the President directing 
me to break camp, and march againat Jackson at Harrisonburg. 
As stated in the order, the objects of the movement were, first, 
to relieve General Banks ; secondly, to cut ofl:' and capture 
Jackson and his force in the Valley of the Shenandoah. 

It was the seventh or eighth da}^ of a storm. Urging 
forward by forced marches troops already worn with fatigue, 
I had reached Franklin in advance of supplies, to relieve 
Schenck and Milroy. The streams at my rear were swollen 
by the incessant rains, and the roads had become almost im- 
passable. With a complement of wagons much exceeding 
that upon the route, the supply would have been but meagre, 
even in fair weather. With the limited number available, 
together with the hindrances encountered, the supply was far 
below the need, l^ot so much as one-qup"ter forage was got 
forward, and, except an incomplete rat' .a of bread, no rations 



12 

entirely inadequate transportation, but was obliged to rely 
upon renewed efforts at the rear to get forwar "■ in time what- 
ever should be most needed to sustain my troops. At four 
o'clock in the morning of the 12th my advance had forded the 
Shenandoah at Petersburg, and on the forenoon of the 14th, 
after a camp of one night upon the route, I reached Franklin. 
Preferring to avoid any immediate encounter with my force as 
concentrated, Jackson, leaving temporarily a thin curtain of 
his people to disguise the movement, began an early retreat. 
By sundown of the 15th he had disappeared in a southeasterly 
direction from my front, taking the road toward Shenandoah 
Mountain. 

Although hitherto crippled for want of transportation, and 
wanting more than ever supplies of every description, I had 
reason to expect that with economy in the camp, as well as 
just effort on the part of agencies elsewhere, deficiencies would 
yet be made good. Accordingly, for the ten days next follow- 
ing upon my arrival at Franklin, I addressed myself to the 
task of getting into order and condition my troops, as well as 
to details of the movements projected against Knoxville and 
the Yirginia and Tennessee Eailroad. While thus occupied, I 
received from the Secretarv of AVar the following; urgent dis- 
patch, which made me still more deeply regret the embarrass- 
ments of my situation : 

Washington, May 16, 1862. 

Major- 0€7ieral Fremont, Franklin. 

Tlie President desires to know whether you design to more on to the 
Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, and break it between Newbern and 
Salem, according to the plan you proposed and he approved ; and also 
whether, having reached and broken that road, you cannot move forward 
rapidly upon Richmond by that route ? And by what time you can reach 
the Railroad, and how long it will take you from there to reach Richmond 
Please answer immediately. 

E. M. STANTON, 

Secretary of War. 

In the meantime the campaign was being well carried 
forward. In execution of the plan upon my right, the opera- 
tions of General Cox were resulting in brilliant success. 
Moving forward as directed, with a view to reach and sever 



13 

the railroad, his forces were attacked at Lewisburg, May 23d, 
by a body of the enemy over tliree thousand strong, under the 
rebel leader Heth. 

After an engagement of several hours, the enemy were 
routed, and fled in disorder from the field. Four pieces of 
artillery were captured by General Cox's troops, two hundred 
stands of small arms, and over one hundred prisoners. 

Our loss was ten killed and about forty wounded. ^ i this 
brilliant affair the conduct of Colonel Crooke's P ,^ , ^oear- 
ing the brunt of the attack, cannot be too high'/ ptaised. 

The rebel loss in killed and wounded '.i this action was 
also severe. * 

But events were now taking place in another direction, 
which had the effect to terminate suddenly my proposed cam- 
paign, and divert my column, intended for Knoxville, upon a 
line of march entirely new. 

The rebel General Jackson, quitting my front, and turning 
abruptly to the north into the Shenandoah Yalley, had, with 
his customary impetuosity, attacked General Banks at Front 
Royal, pressing him backward toward Strasburg and "Win- 
chester, and threatening the whole valley of the Potomac. 

With the intelligence of these events, dispatched to me under 
date of May 24th, came also an order from the President directing 
me to break camp, and march against Jackson at Harrisonburg, 
As stated in the order, tlie objects of the movement were, first, 
to relieve General Banks ; secondly, to cut oft' and capture 
Jackson and his force in the Valley of the Shenandoah, 

It was the seventh or eighth day of a storm. Urging 
forward by forced marches troops already worn with fatigue, 
I had reached Franklin in advance of supplies, to relieve 
Schenck and Milroy. The streams at my rear were swollen 
by the incessant rains, and the roads had become almost im- 
passable. With a complement of wagons much exceeding 
that upon the route, the supply would have been but meagre, 
even in fair weather. With the limited number available, 
together with the hindrances encountered, the supply was far 
below the need. Not so much as one-quarter forage was got 
forward, and, except an incomplete ration of bread, no rations 



14 

had been got up for the men. For days together, fresh beef, 
with a little salt, was the only provision on hand for issue. 
Coffee, so essential and desirable in the field, was becoming a 
luxury almost unknown. Subsistence arriving under invoice 
to a particular brigade, w^as taken by order, and, so far as it 
would go, distributed among all. Sick-lists were largely on 
the i^^'Yjy^'se; and such was the demoralization induced by 
privy ']s endured, that demonstrations among the men, 
amoi , n . ,^"^ Imost open mutiny, had, in instances, to be put 
down by thev^ong hand. 

Of forage iti^the country about, scarcely a single pound 
could be gleaned. \.Tt had b^en already too well stripped by 
rebels. Our animals,, then, were starving — dying, in fact, and 
by scores, as even prio"' to my reaching Franklin, they had, 
from the same causes, bt3;un to do out of the command of 
General Schenck. 

With the order directing my march, authority was now 
given me to order the purchase of horses, or otherwise in the 
language of the dispatch to " take them wherever or however 
I could get them." But it came too late to aid me. Naturally, 
upon the absence of forage, and the causes which led to it, 
animals also had disappeared. As to waiting for the arrival 
of horses or mules from Wheeling, that was impossible, under 
the terms of the order. I was to move at once. 

Of the diiferent roads leading from Franklin to Harrison- 
burg, all but one had been obstructed by Jackson in his re- 
treat. Bridges and culverts had been dvjstroyed, rocks rolled 
down, and, in one instance, trees felled across the way for the 
distance of nearly a mile. The road still left open ran south- 
wardly, reaching Harrisonburg by a long detour. Granting, 
however, that loss of time by removal of obstacles, or by 
taking the longer route, was no consideration, a march in 
any direction, tending to lengthen my line of supplies, W£ 
little better than a physical impossibility. The condition of 
my troops forbade it. Strategically speaking, also, a move- 
ment toward Harrisonburg would not have simply endangered, 
it would have been fatal to my lines of supply. Jackson, re- 
treating from his raid, could strike westwardly from Strasburg 



15 

or Winchester, by way of Komney or Moortield, or both. 
Indeed, as the sequel will develop, it was afterward regarded 
probable by higher authorities that he had taken these very 
directions. Reaching New Creek, then, and Petersburg, 
the rebel leader would have destroyed mr depots at these 
points, and captui*ed every train upon the route. Again, 
while as a practical relief to General Banks, the movement by 
way of Harrisonburg would have been of no greater import- 
ance than a movement striking the valley farther north, or 
lower down, it would, at the same time, have permitted the 
enemy to avoid all chance of collision with my force. M' 
own and the rebel columns would have been const 
moving in opposite dii'ections upon opposite sides f*' 
cies of parallelogram, having for its four corners 
Harrisonburg, Strasburg, and Petersburg — or otherw 
Chester, Pomney, &q. Our relative positions only would havi 
been changed, with the difference that the gain would hav 
been all upon the side of the rebel — the loss upon mim 
Defying contact, also, Jackson would have escaped intar 
with his prisoners and plunder. This was a contingency n 
desired by the President, nor contemplated in his dispatch. 

Accepting, then, the spirit, rather than the letter of t 
order — or, if the letter, the added expression to " opera 
against the enemy in such way as to relieve Banks — I judge 
it within my discretion to select another than the route speci 
ically set down. This, even though ample means had existec 
with a fresh and active column to move southward upon my 
original destination, or toward the immediate east. Instead, 
then, of the attempt through a barren district by any of the 
above-named roads, I determined to move rearward as far as 
Petersburg ; thence striking easterly by way of Mooriield and 
Wardensville, to Strasburg. Retracing thus for a short 
distance my supply-line, I could feed my hungry troops, 
gather stores, and, possibly, by vigorous effort, reach 
the Shenandoah Yalley in time to intercept Jackson, going 
south. 

Happily, before leaving camp the next morning. May 25th, 
a later order was received from the Secretary of War, confirm- 



16 

ing previous conclusions, and leaving me free to choose raj 
line of march. I was to " direct my attention to falling upon 
the enemy wherever I could tind him, with all speed." 

With the Secretary's despatch came also the information 
that General 5^' nks had abandoned Strasburg, been driven 
from Winchester, and M'as in full retreat upon Harper's 
Ferry. That the enemy would, of his own will, relinquish 
pursuit, was not consistent with his manifest objects in enter- 
ing the valley. I was therefore fully apprised of the situa- 
tion. General McDowell, it was farther stated to me in 
•'^ference to the movement about to be made, would operate 
rd the same object as myself with his troops. 

'*ing to the chances of a possession of the telegraph 
,ny moment by the rebels, I did not, at this time, com- 
-.. e my plan of march to the President. It was not de- 
irable that the enemy should be by any process informed. 

Upon fjL^e road out from Franklin were met, at various 
oints, my staUed and scattered trains, laden with provisions 
nd forage for the command. From the stores contained I 
IS enabled to supply present necessities, and, by liberal issues 
men and animals, aftbrd the necessary strength for coming 
igue and travel. At Petersburg was found an accmnu- 
tion of imperfect rations for five days. Causing three days' 
ations to be cooked and phi' *^d in haversacks, I ordered trains 
lade up to carry forward the remainder, together with supplies 
>f ammunition and forage. Tents, with the exception of a very 
few for indispensable staff and hospital purposes, were at this 
point required to be abandoned and placed in store. In like 
manner, all surplus personal baggage was directed to be cast 
off, it being my object to put the column in the lightest pos- 
sible marching order. 

My movement northward leaving the Department much 
exposed, and particularly to the west and south, General Cox 
was enjoined to double vigilance against the enemy, and 
ordered to do the best he was able in his position. 

General Kelly, within the raiboad district, was directed to 
concentrate, as far as practicable, his force, with a view to the 
safety of New Creek and other important points. 



\ 



17 

My column had reached Petersburg on the afternoon of 
May 26th. On the 27th at daybreak the march was resumed. 
The troops, fording the Shenandoah and camping at night 
near Moorhekl, arrived on the 28th at Fabius, about ten 
miles easterly from Moortield, upon Brancli Mountain. At 
this latter point, upon the written protest of my Medical 
Director against further marching of the command without 
one day's rest, a halt was called for the 29th. Hundreds of 
stragglers and broken-down men from the Blenker Division 
had been left along the road in the ascent of the mountain, 
and it was plain their condition demanded consideratio;i " 
They were weak and reduced, not only from recent fatip'^* ,.. 
and want of food, but from previous hardship and pri IVon 
on the route from the Potomac. I could not ventui'''r,V^ pro- 
ceed with them in disorder and undertake with/v/ety the 
work in prospect. Ay 

During the day's delay an inspection was ha^^nd roll-calls 
ordered, in presence of officers specially des%nated to the 
purpose. The result disclosed material inaccuracies in returns 
thus far accepted from General Blenker V command, and ex- 
hibited a falling ofi' in the aggregate of^ effective force at this- 
time most unwelcome. In Blenker's Division, the number 
reported present and tit for duty was below six thousand. As 
an accession, a remaining company of the Sixth Ohio Cavalry, 
having just obtained horses, joined at this camp. 

While halting here at Fabius, a party of Indiana Cavalry, 
scouting well to the front, came upon a reconnoitering party of 
the enemy near Wardensville and attacked them briskly. 
The enemy were driven, with loss of two killed and several 
wounded, Colonel Downey, in command of our force, having 
his horse shot under him. 

Later upon the 29th, a dispatch sent forward from Tele- 
graph Station, brought an order from the President, directing 
me, under date of the 28th, to halt my command at Moorfield 
— or, otherwise, " if I heard of the enemy in the general direc- 
tion of Romne}-," to march upon him. This order was based 
upon the conclusion that Jackson — who had by this time 
pressed General Banks as far back as Williamsport — would 

3 



18 

turn westward from "Winchester, along the northern end of 
the parallelogram I have indicated. It having been subse- 
quently ascertained, however, that the rebels were still occu- 
pied with their work in the valley of Winchester and Martins- 
burg, the order was withdrawn, and I was again directed to 
move upon the enemy " by the best route I could." 

On the 30th, I moved forward with my command from 
Fabius. A renewed storm made the roads heavy and the 
march most fatiguing. On the 31st my column passed the 
summit of the mountain between Lost River and Cedar Creek, 
marching most of the night, and closing up in a drenching 
i ain, amid intense darkness, at Cedar Creek. 

" had now reached the point indicated in the following tele- 
gram. • 

Washington, May 29th, 1862. 
Maj.- Gen. 1 ■^.mont : 

General . rDowell'e advance, if not checked by the enemy, should or 
probably will ..1 at Front Royal by twelve, noon, to-morrow. His force, 
when lip, will be about twenty thousand. Please have your force at 
Strasburg, or, if the route you are moving on does not lead to that point, 
as near Strasbui'g as the enemy may be by that time. Youx dispatch No. 
30 received, and satisfactorj^ 

A. LINCOLN. 



Washington, May 30, '1862, 4 P. M. 
Maj.- Gen. Fremont : 

Yom's, saying you will reach Strasburg or vicinity at 5 P. M. Saturday, 
has been received and sent to General McDowell, and he directed to act in 
view of it. You must be up to time of your promise if possible. 

A. LINCOLN. 

At Cedar Creek the road forks, one branch leading to 
Strasburg, and the other in a northeasterly direction to Win- 
chester. Expecting to learn something of General McDowell's 
movements, early in the day I had sent forv/ard Major Has- 
kell, of my staff, with a party of scouts. He fell in with a 
party of the enemy's cavalry, and two of my scouts were cap- 
tured at Strasburg, but no information was obtained. 

With the arrival of the rear the leading corps of my com- 
mand again stretched forward, taking the road to Strasburg. 

At seven in the morning of this day, June 1st, my advance, 
under Lieut.-Colonel Cluseret, first touched Jackson's main 



19 

body, driving in the advanced pickets of General Ewell's bri- 
gade. Pressing forward and encountering and driving stronger 
bodies of skirmishers, the cohimn, within a short distance, 
came upon cavahy and a battery in position, which imme- 
diately opened fire. The enemy's artillery was engaged by 
detachments from the 8th Virginia and 60th Ohio, under 
Major Oley, supported afterward by a section of artillery, 
under Lt. -Colonel Pilsen. The fire of the enemy's musketry 
now brought into action, indicated the presence of two or 
three regiments. I was entirely ignorant of what had taken 
place in the valley beyond, and it was now evident that Jack- 
son, in superior force, was at or near Strasburg. 

In anticipation, therefore, of possible demonstratioryon 
his part before some needed rest could be taken, my co^^^and, 
as they came up, were ordered to position. Abou^-^oon the 
enemy's batteries ceased fire, and my troops we>' /Ordered to 
encamp. Our cavalry being pushed forward, fovfm the enemy 
withdrawing, and a strong column of infantry just defiling 
past our front. A reconnoissance by Col. Cluseret, with the 
Eighth Virginia, pushed to within two miles of Strasburg, 
showed the enemy withdrawn, and at nightfall this ofiicer 
with his brigade, accompanied by a battalion of cavalry and a 
section of artillery, was ordered to move forvv^ard upon Stras- 
burg, and determine the position of the enemy. The day 
closed with one of the most violent rain storms I have ever 
seen, with really terrific lightning and thunder ; and the night 
being very dark, and Colonel Cluseret being without guides 
or knowledge of the country, his troops passed the town of 
Strasburg, and, marching to the light of the enemy's fires, 
about eleven o'clock came into contact "with Ashby's cavalry 
which occupied the road, forming the rear of Jackson's posi- 
tion, about two miles beyond Strasburg, on the road to 
"Woodstock. 

Disobeying the order to charge, aQ:er a scattering fii-e, our 
cavalry broke in a shameful panic to the rear, passing over 
and carrying witii them the artillery. To the honor of the 
Sixtieth Ohio, which, at this moment, formed the head of the 
reconnoitering columUj not a man of them followed the dis- 



20 

graceful example, but delivered tlieir fire steadily, and checked 
any movement on tlie part of the enemy. 

The officers and men, without distinction, of the Sixtieth 
Ohio and Eighth Virginia, which composed this brigade, de- 
serve special mention for the steadiness and bravery which 
distinguished them during the affairs of this day, when both 
regiments were for the first time under fire. Having ascer- 
tained the position of the enemy, Colonel Cluseret withdrew 
his men and returned to camp. The reconnoissance showed 
the enemy in retreat. 

"With daylight of June 2d, my command moved in pursuit. 
iPassing Strasburg, I was joined by General Bayard, who had 
bek^ sent forward by General McDowell with a cavalry force 
of ab?nt eight hundred men and four pieces of artillery, with 
a batti''"on of the Pennsylvania Bucktails under Colonel 

Kane. mi 

Further"' long, the locality of Colonel Cluseret's engage- 
ment of the m^ht before was marked by one of our caissons, 
which had been disabled and left for the night on the ground, 
and by several of the enemy's killed and wounded, some ten 
of whom had been already cared for by Colonel Kane. 

The route now to be followed lay along the turnpike, 
s retching southwardly from Strasburg toward Staunton. Its 
more even and compact surface was a welcome exchange for 
the mire and sloughs of the mountain region passed. 

Closely pressed by my advance, the enemy, at about ten 
A. M., turned to make a stand. He was vigorously shelled 
by Buell's and Schermer's batteries, under direction of Lieut.- 
Col. Pilsen, Aide-de-Camp and Chief-of-Artillery, supported 
by General Bayard's command of cavalry, augmented by about 
six hundred from my own column, under Colonel Zagonyi, 
Aide-de-Camp. After determined resistance for an hour, the 
enemy were driven from position, and again pursued. Ee- 
peatedly during the day they faced about, and were as often 
compelled to relinquish the fight. 

The pursuit was rapid, not less than eighteen miles being 
made in the space of five hours. In one instance, scarcely 
a hundi-ed yards separated my advance from the enemy— the 



/ 



21 

latter, however, gaining a small bridge, and unlimbering 
rapidly upon a rocky rise beyond. Colonel Pilsen lost, at 
this time, his horse, shot from imder him, and was himself 
slightly wounded by a volley from the rebels. But notwith- 
standing the excellent marching made by our infantry, it 
was impossible to get forward in time for eflective operation. 
By sunset the enemy had reached, for the night, the higher 
points beyond AVoodstock. The retreat was reckless. Over 
iive hundred prisoners fell into our hands, and a number of 
our own men, captured from General Banks, were recovered. 
Several hundred stands of small arms, cast away, or left in ,,■ 
stacks by the rebels, were also gathered. Of gray-coated / 
stragglers, at least a thousand were in the woods along the 
road and country adjoining. Broken ambulances, clcdiing, 
blankets, and articles of equipment, lined the route. Our loss 
was small — but one or two killed, and a proportionate number 
wounded. At the last stand made by the enemy, he lost seven 
killed, witli a number of horses. His total loss during the 
day must have been considerable. At about five in the after- 
noon General Stahel's brigade occupied Woodstock. 

Although much fatigued by the forced march of the day 
previous, my command at an early hour of the morning of 
June third, were upon the road to resume pursuit. Again the 
rear-guard of the enemy turned to cover his main body 
or to gain time for placing obstacles, tearing up the road, 
or destroying culverts and bridges. The lire of the op- 
posing batteries was mutually brisk, with at intervals an 
accompaniment of the dropping shots of small arms. Stren- 
uous effort was made by the rebels to destroy the bridge over 
Stony Creek, at Edinburg, about five miles out from Wood- 
stock. A portion of the planks was torn up, and the timbers 
so far cut that the structure sunk, partially broken, about mid- 
way of the current. So prompt, however, were my advance 
troops, that the party left by the enemy were compelled to re- 
treat in haste, without further execution of their task. A ford 
was found at a short distance up the stream, and with some 
difficulty, cavalry and artillery were gotten across. Ultimately 
my baggage and supply trains passed safely. After some hasty 



22 

repairs, infantry were enabled to cross the bridge. On account 
of depth of water at the ford, ammunition was removed from 
caissons and wagons, and carried over by hands of the men. 
For farther and more permanent repairs of the bridge. Colonel 
Raynolds, of my staff. Engineer, was left with a small detail. 

By noon my command were mainly upon the farther bank, 
and again in rapid motion. The bridge over Cedar Creek, at 
Mount Jackson, was saved nearly intact, by the celerity with 
which the enemy were overtaken. The rr'^l General Asliby 
barely escaped capture at this point, by Cr >i Conger's com- 
pany of Third Virginia Cavalry. Th.. ':)any, pressing 
i^orward under their persevering leader, \v.. in season to 
coi>;i^e upon a body of the enemy about to fire tlic > larger and 
more\|mportant bridge, beyond Mount Jackson, crossing the 
l^orth Tork of the Shenandoah. A gallant charge was made, 
but volley*^ of grape and musketry drove back tlie small com- 
mand. General Bayard in the meantime arrived with the main 
body of cavab V, upon an elevation overlooking the bridge, but 
it is to be regret i^d that artillery could not possibly be gotten 
up in time to warr^t his demonstration in heavier force. 

The bridge was successfully fired. Burning rapidly with 
thick volumes of flame and smoke, by the time my main col- 
umn entered Mount Jac^kson Tillage, it had fallen to the 
stream below. \ 

A body of the enemy incautiously attempting to go into 
camp, within range across the river, were speedily shelled by 
batteries run up upon theblufls, and after some excellent prac- 
tice on the part of our artillerists, driven out. Our total of 
loss during the day was one killed and a few wounded. 

The pontoons procured by me at Pittsburgh, having been 
kept well up with the column, were now ordered to the front, 
and preparations immediately made to gain passage by re- 
bridging the Shenandoah. The stream was at this point wide 
and rapid, and had been swollen by recent rains. Major 
Haskell, of active California experience, plunged with 
his horse into the current, and by swimming to the op- 
posite bank, was enabled to fix fast the preparatory ropes. 
A corps of employes, acting as pontoniers, under Lieuten- 



23 

ant Robinson, of Ohio troops, together with liberal detail 
from infantry regiments, were also put promptly at work 
A heavy rain set in, but operations Avere continued through 
the night. By six in the morning the bridge was made 
available for crossing, and a force of infantry and cavalry 
gotten over. Suddenly, however, the river began to rise to a 
yet greater height. In the space of four hours, flooded by the 
storm and its mountain tributaries, it had gained full twelve 
feet, with a current correspondingly turbulent and swift. The 
drift borne down was working great mischief, and several of 
the boats were swamped. To save the bridge from utter 
destruction, the ropes were cut, and the pontoons swung round 
to the northern shore. Much of the planking and timber was 
lost. The troops already across being well posted, and amply 
covered by our batteries upon the bluffs, little apprehension 
was felt as regarded their immediate safety. Toward night 
the stream — as suddenly as it had risen — began to subside, and 
parties at work renewed their eftbrts. Their task was arduous, 
and itwas not until ten A. M. of the next day, that the bridge 
was again in condition for crossing. 

It will be remembered that, at the date of my march from 
Franklin, information was conveyed to me that General 
McDowell would operate toward the same objects as myself, 
in capturing or driving out Jackson. Very earnest assurances 
to this effect were subsequently given me while upon the route, 
both by the President and Secretary of War. Whether in 
General McDowell's case as in my own, departmental lines, 
or the technicalities of previous orders were temporarily to 
be lost sight of, was not explained. Arriving, however, 
within the Shenandoah Yalley, I deemed it not extravagant 
to expect of that officer that he should so far co-operate as, if 
not himself in advance, to send me troops to secure and hold 
fast prisoners as well as to keep intact points of my line in 
rear. Accordingly, during the delay at Mount Jackson, I 
despatched to General McDowell Captain Howard, of my 
staff, with orders substantially to the above effect. 

The following is a copy of his reply, declining to recognize 
authority on my part : 



24 



Headquarters Department Rappahannock, 

Front Royal, June 6, 1862. 
Major- General 3. C. Fremont, 

Commanding Mountain Department, Mount Jackson, Va. 
General : 

I received to-day a letter from your Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, 
ordering me in your name to send some of my troops to Strasburg. 

Before the receipt of this paper, I had written to Major-General Banks, 
commanding Department of Shenandoah at Winchester, calling his atten- 
tion to this point, for such action in the case as he might see fit to take. 
I did this after failing — on account of the bridges being carried away and 
all communication cut off— to get the prisoners transferred to this place to 
send them to Washington. 

I beg you to call the attention of your staff officer to the terms he has 
employed in his communication to mo ; making it in the nature of a posi- 
tive, peremptory order, as if to me under your command. Being, like your- 
self, the commander of a separate, indtpendent, military, geographical 
department, with certain troops assigned to me by the Secretary of War, 
and being here in a neighboring department for a special temporary pur- 
pose, under the direct orders and instructions of the President, I cannot 
receive orders from any officer, save in the accidental temporary case pro- 
vided for in the Sixty-second Article of War, a case which arose when you 
came in contact with my cavalry brigade at Strasburg. 

In reference to this brigade, I have the honor to refer to General Orders 
No. 29, of March 22, 1862, and say that I wish you Avould direct this 
brigade to march at the first opportunity to join Major-General Shields, at 
Luray Court House ; it being necessary there to further the instructions 
under which I am acting. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfuUj', 

Your most obedient servant, 

IRWIN Mcdowell, 

Major-General Commamling Department Rappahannock. 

Of the operations of General McDowell, through the col- 
umns of General Shields, up the vallej of Luray, the value 
will hereafter be seen. 

From General Banks, to whom I had in like manner sent 
a messenger, a reply, though exhibiting the utmost cordiality, 
informed me that he was without supplies or transportation 
and unable to move. He would, however, endeavor to send 
me some cavalry. General Sigel, subsequently addressed, 
although he would " try his best," found his troops in a condi- 
tion such as would render them " an incumbrance and not a 
help to me." It was not until after I had left Mount Jackson 
that any of the dispatches embodying the above were received. 
But the fact stood that, at the date of my departure from this 
town (June 5th), the contest with Jackson, so far as concerned 



25 

Shenandoah Valley proper, remained upon my hands. Al- 
though I had crossed the mountains on an errand of aid to 
others, I found myself without conjunction or combination, 
either with the forces relieved, or with a force sent upon the 
same object as my own from an opposite direction. I present 
the point with the object only that it may be both understood 
and realized, and with no other. On the 5th of June, then, 
crossing safely the bridge of pontoons, m}- column, with 
scarcely more than half the numbers of the enemy in advance, 
retook the trail, and pushed steadily forward. A lapse of 
more than thirty hours, since the burning of the main bridge 
over the Shenandoah, had given the enemy an advantage he 
proved not slow to use. 

He Avas not overtaken upon the 5th, and having made 
eighteen miles, and passing on the way the enemy's fires still 
burning, my command was bivouacked beyond New Market, 
the enemy's camp being but a few miles ahead. On the 6th 
I was enabled by an early and rapid march to restore the lost 
contact. Our progress was a little retarded by the burnt and 
blazing culverts which had been tired by the enemy along the 
road, but sharp artillery and cavalry skirmishing was renewed 
during the forenoon, and about two o'clock my advance drove 
his rear-guard through Harrisonburg. The direction taken by 
the main force of the enemy being uncertain, \nj troops were 
ordered into camp around the town. Late in the afternoon 
the First New Jersey Cavalry, with a battalion of Fourth New 
York Cavalry, came suddenly upon the enemy's camp in the 
woods, several miles to the southeast, and was driven out with 
serious loss, leaving Col. Wyndham, and Captains Shellmire, 
Clarke, and Haynes, in the hands of the enemy. A little 
before sundown. General Bayard entered the woods with four 
companies of Kane's Rifles (Bucktails), and the First Penn- 
sylvania Cavalry. Almost immediately after getting into the 
timber the Rifles encountered a regiment of cavalry with artil- 
lery, and a regiment of infantry, from which they received a 
very damaging fire ; a very severe engagement of half an 
hour followed, during which the Rifles lost upward of forty 
in killed, wounded and missing. Colonel Kane was wounded 
4 



26 

and taken prisoner, Captain Taylor a prisoner, Captain Blan- 
cliard shot throngh both legs, and Lieutenant Swain wounded. 
This noble bod}^ of riflemen is entitled to the expression of my 
warm admiration for excellent conduct and efliciency during 
the march, and for distinguished bravery on this occasion. 

General Bayard in this, as in all other instances of the 
kind during the pursuit, evinced the qualities of the true sol- 
dier. 

Colonel Cluseret coming up with his brigade to the sup- 
port of the riflemen, the enemy retreated in disorder, leaving 
him in possession of their camp. On their part the enemy 
in this sharp aftair sufl:ered still more severely, losing among 
the killed General Ashby, who up to this time had covered 
their retreat with admirable audacity and skill. 

Leaving their dead and wounded on the ground, with the 
growing darkness the enemy continued their retreat, precipi- 
tated b}' the several assaults of our troops. 

On the 7th, a reconnoissance in force was sent under Gen. 
Milroy in the direction of Port Republic, and reconnoissances 
pushed toAvard Keyzeltown and McGreggorsville, and on the 
Staunton Turnpike to the Middle River where the bridges were 
found destroyed. These reconnoissances showed that Jackson, 
abandoning the turnpike, had struck b}' a diflioult and trouble- 
some road toward Port Republic, and that he was about to 
turn in force to dispute my further advance. Accordingly, a 
movement in the new direction taken by him was determined 
for tlie 8th, and early upon the moriiing of this da}"^ the march 
was resumed, the command taking the road leading directly 
through the woods from Harrisonburg to Cross Keys. 

My column as constituted and now on the road was as 
follows : 

The advance — Colonel Cluseret's Brigade, consisting of the 
Sixtieth Ohio and Eighth Virginia Infantry, reinforced by the 
Thirty-fourth New York (Garibaldi Guard) — the main column 
comprising, 

1. Dickel's Fourth ISTew York Cavalry; 

2. General Stahel's Brigade, consisting of the 8th, 41st and 



27 

45th New York, and 27th Pennsylvania Infantry; Dilger's, 
Buell's, and Schirmer's Batteries. 

3. General Bohlen's Brigade, composed of the 54th and 
58th New York, and 74th and 75th Pennsylvania Infantry ; 
Weiderich's Battery. 

4. General Milroy's Brigade, composed of the 25th Ohio, 
the 2d, 3d, and 5th Virginia Infantry ; Hyman's, Johnson's, 
and Ewing's Batteries. 

5th. General Scheiick's Brigade, composed of the 32d, 73d, 
75th, and 82d Ohio Infantry ; Debeck's and Kigby's "P'.tteries, 
and a small detachment of Cavalry. 

Kear guard, following npon ambulances and aramimition 
trains : General Stein wehr's Brigade, under command of 
Colonel Coltes, consisting of the 29th and 68th New York 
the 73d Pennsylvania Infantry Regiments, and Dickmann's 
Battery. 

Special investigation and roll-call at Fabius, May 29th, 
had given as ];)resent effective strength, of all arms, something 
over eleven thousand. Deducting from this number garrisons, 
guards, working parties, <fcc., left in rear, together with dis- 
abled, sick, and stragglers upon the route, and ten thousand 
five hundred men is a liberal estimate of force in hand and 
for duty in above column, June 8th. 

Our lowest estimate of Jackson's strength gave him 
eighteen thousand. 

Many of the horses of General Bayard's Cavalry having 
been reported unserviceable for want of shoes, his command 
was left temporarily at Harrisonburg, in charge of baggao-e 
trains. My Chief Quartermaster having fortunately provided 
for contingencies of the kind, such animals as proved in need 
were duly attended to, and General Bayard at a late hour 
came forward. Part of his force was . retained as escort to 
baggage. *^"d the remainder disposed to cover the line of com- 
miT"' xon against parties which might threaten it from the 
mh.aj by-roads or cross-roads striking the main route; 

At about 8.30 a. m. my advance, under Colonel Cluseret 
came up with the enemy at a point near Union Chm'ch, and 
immediately engaged him. The rebels fell stubbornly back 



28 

through the timber and open ground, Colonel Cluseret vigor- 
ously pursuing for the distance of about a mile. At the local- 
ity now reached he came upon Jackson's main force in order 
of battle. 

In the meantime ray own main body coming promptly up, 
the several brigades were successively directed upon lines se- 
lected, with a view to general attack. (See map.) 

The formation was substantially upon Colonel Cluseret's 
Brigade, which had pushed the forces oi)posed to it fully back 
upon their supports, and now held lirmly a good position, well 
to the front (A). 

General Stahel's Brigade, advancing along the main road 
till past Pirkey's Farm, took position in the open ground, 
forming the left wing of tlie first line. 

General Milroy's Brigade, leaving the main road, and 
turning sharply to the right, formed in with a lessened inter- 
val upon Cluseret's right, becoming thus the right of the first 
line. 

General Bohlen's Brigade was conducted in nearly the same 
direction as Stahel's, taking position opposite to the interval 
between Staliel and Cluseret, and — pending the arriA^al of 
Steinwehr's Brigade — acting as reserve to both. 

General Schenck's Brigade, following in the direction 
taken by Milroy's, was placed in position bringing his line in 
echellon to the right and rear, securing thus our right against 
any flank demonstrations by the enemy. 

My directions for the general disposition were promptly 
and skillfully carried out by my Chief-of Stafl", Colonel Albert. 
Through a like skill and energy on the part of my Chief-of- 
Artillery, Col. J. Pilsen, as also of his assistant on the occa- 
sion. Captain Dilger, eight and a half out of my ten batteries 
were, within the brief space of thirty minutes, got into posi- 
tion favorable to the work required of them. 

Our line of battle, then, stood thus : Right wing, Milroy, 
with Schenck in reserve ; left wing, Stahel ; center, Cluseret ; 
reserve to Stahel and Cluseret, Bohlen. 

Colonel Dichel's 4tli New York Cavalry occupied position 
upon the extreme left, guarding approaches in our direction. 



29 



"Watching our right and rear were the cavalry of Schenck's 
Brigade. Captain Conger's company of cavahy was held in 
position near headquarters. 

The enemy occupied a position of uncommon strength, 
commanding the junction of the roads to Port Republic. He 
had chosen his ground with great skill, and with a previous 
full knowledge of the localities. His main line was advan- 
tageously posted upon a ridge, protected in front by a steep 
declivity, and almost entirely masked by thick woods, and 
covered by fences, l^ear his center, and on the summit of an 
abrupt ascent, bordered at the base by the high, perpendicular 
bank of a marshy creek, he had massed in addition to his guns 
elsewhere, three of his best batteries. 

From superiority of numbers, his flanks both at the right 
and left considerably overlapped my own. It was almost im- 
possible to force this position by a regular attack in front, 
which would have exposed us to cross fires and flank attacks ; 
and to have attacked him irregularly and at random on either 
of his flanks, would have carried us ofi^ the roads into wooded 
and broken ground of which I was entirely ignorant and 
would have very certainly resulted in disaster. To give this 
etfort any chance of success it would have been necessary to 
lose valuable time in reconnoitering the ground, during which 
he could have withdrawn his troops, crossed and destroyed 
the bridge at Port Kepublic, and possibly, too, the command 
of General Shields. 

I was without reliable maps or guides, but from what 
could be seen of the roads and from the understood position of 
the bridge at Port Republic, I judged that the enemy's right 
was his strategic flank. I decided therefore to press him from 
this side, with the object to seize, if possible, his line of retreat ; 
and accordingly gave all the strength practicable to my left. 

Continuous firing had been kept up during the time occu- 
pied in getting my forces into position, and with the full es- 
tablishment of my lines the battle became general. Urging 
vigorously forward his brigade, General Stahel encountered in 
the first belt of woods a strong line of skirmishers, which 
with hard fighting was driven out of the timber, and pushed 



30 

by the 8th and 45th N'ew York over the ground beyond to the 
edge of the woods, where these regiments came suddenly upon 
the right of the enemy's main line, held by the troops of Gen. 
Trimble, and composed in part of the 16th Mississippi, the 
15th and 16th Alabama, the 21st North Carolina, and 21st 
Georgia. Two of General Stahel's best regiments, the 27th 
Pennsjdvania and 41st New York, had been diverted to the 
right in the timber, and the shock of the entire force here was 
sustained by the Stli and 45th New York, and principally by 
the 8th, which was attacked in front and flank by four regi- 
ments. 

This regiment behaved with great gallantry, charging with 
impetuosity into the enemy's ranks, and for a time holding 
its own ; but yielding at length to the great superiority of 
numbers was driven, together with the 45th, back over the 
open ground and through the woods upon Bohlen's Brigade, 
which had in the meantime advanced to Stahel's support and 
joined in the action, supported by our batteries. 

Steinwehr's Brigade coming up was deployed in rear of 
the batteries, and General Blenker arriving took command of 
his division. The enemy now brought up additional artillery 
into the open ground on my extreme left, and General Tay- 
lor's reserve brigade entering the woods the lighting continued 
with great severity continuously along the timber in front of 
om' position. 

A Mississippi regiment, charging with yells upon Buell's 
Battery, was gallantly met with a bayonet charge by the 27th 
Pennsylvania, under cover of which the battery was with- 
drawn. A Louisiana regiment of Taylor's Brigade under- 
taking a charge upon Dilger's battery, was received witli a tire 
of canister and grape delivered with such precision and rapid- 
ity as nearly destroyed it. 

Every attempt of the enemy to emerge from the cover of 
the woods was repulsed by artillery and counter attacks of 
infantry, and his loss at this portion of the field, inflicted 
especially by artillery, was very great. On om* part, the loss 
was heavy, the Stli New York alone losing 46 killed and 134 
^unded. 



31 

One of my aides-de-camp, Captain Nicliolas Dunka, a ca- 
pable and brave officer, was killed by a mnsket ball, while 
carrying an order to tins part of the field. Colonel Gilsa, of 
the 41st JSTew York ; Captain Miser and Lientenant Branden- 
stein, of General Blenker's Staft', were severely wonnded. 

The enemy's movements, in the bringing up of artillery 
and fresli trooi)s threatening entirely to envelop my left, a 
new position was taken up at the edge of the timber on the 
line " B," and the enemy reoccupied the belt of woods lost by 
them at the beginning. 

Up to this point the musketry and artillery fire had been 
incessant and the fighting throughout the field generally severe. 
Further to the right our artillery, under the innnediate direc- 
tion of Col. Pilsen, had been hotly engaged with the batteries 
of the enemy's center. 

Milroy and Cluseret were opposed to Generals Elzey and 
Early, commanding tlie enemy's right and center. Our own 
center under Cluseret, after an ineti'ectual attempt upon the 
enemy's batteries, had held obstinately every foot of its ad- 
vanced ground, repelling with steadiness and gallantry re- 
peated assaults of the enemy. 

General Milroy had been warmly engaged, driving in a 
strong line of the enemy's skirmishers, attacking their main 
body at close quarters, and suffering severely in an attempt to 
plant a battery upon the heights. Upon the extreme right, 
General Schenck, in support of Milroy, had advanced his line 
extending it into contact with the enemy, occupying them 
with skirmishers, shelling the woods, and checking their ad- 
vance in flank. 

iN^otwithstanding the fair promise held out to an effort on 
the right, I judged it best, at this point, to entirely re-establish 
my whole line in conformity to the changes on the left, pre- 
paratory to a renewal of the battle. 

Accordingly, the brigades of the right were withdrawn for 
a space, and except from a portion of Cluseret's strong posi- 
tion at the center, and occasional exchanges of artillery shots, 
the firing subsided ; the enemy meantime remaining in his 
position, and our pickets occupying securely the points tempo- 
rarily relinquished by the main line. 



32 

Pending tliese preparations, I received by the liands of one 
of my sconts the following letter from General Shields : 

LuKAY, June 8tb, 9^ A. M. 
Major- Omeral Fremont, 

Gomimmding Purming Forces : 
I write by your scouts. I tbiuk by tbis time tbere will be twelve 
pieces of artillery opposite Jackson's train at Port Republic, if be lias ta- 
ken tbat route. Some cavalry and artillery bave pusbed on to Waynes- 
boro' to bum tbe bridge. I liope to bave two brigades at Port Republic 
to-day. I follow myself with two otber brigades to-day from this place. 
If the enemy changes direction, you will please keep me advised. If he 
attempts to force a passage, as my force is not large there yet, I hope you 
will thunder down on his rear. Please send back infonnation from time 
to time. I think Jackson is caught this time. 

Yours, sincerely, 

JAJ^IES SHIELDS, 
Mujor-Oeneral Commandii^ Division. 



This was most welcome intelligence. Hitherto I had re- 
ceived no direct information from General Shields, and, be- 
yond the fact that he was somewhere near Luray, I had no 
positive knowledge of Ids whereabouts or intentions. As the 
moment approached when it became of critical importance 
that we should act together, I had the day before pushed my 
scouts into the Luray Yalley. Several of them were taken by 
the enemy, but one succeeded in reaching me with this letter. 
With the certainty now that General 'Shields was already 
holding the bridge in force, I at once decided to defer until 
morning a renewal of tlie battle. 

My men had been marching and fighting since early in the 
morning; they were fatigued and hungry, and needed rest, 
and I knew they required every advantage I could give. I 
therefore directed the command to bivouac and further opera- 
tions for the day to be brought to a close. My force was 
established for the night upon the line B B, Colonel Cluseret's 
brigade being withdrawn into the woods near Union Church, 
and our pickets remaining, as stated, in occupation of other 
points of the battle-ground. 

The night was busily spent in preparations to have the 
command in readiness for a general advance, planned to take 
place in the morning, and in gathering and caring for the 



33 

wounded and burying the dead. My loss during tlie day in 
killed, wounded and missing, had been upward of six hun- 
dred. 

At dawn the enemy was found to have retired from his 
lines in our immediate front. 

At about 7^ A. M. the line was extended, and at a given 
signal, expecting very soon to come upon the enemy in posi- 
tion, the command moved forward, maintaining admirable 
steadiness and exactness. The enemy's dead in great numbers 
lay upon the field, and some twenty horses, lying together 
upon the heigiits occupied by his center batteries, showed the 
eflect of our artillery. Emerging into the more open ground 
beyond Dunker Church, a black column of smoke rising about 
five miles in advance, showed the Port Republic bridge on 
fire ; and soon afterward the sound of cannon, and white 
wreaths from rapidly exploding shells along tlie line of the 
river showed an engagement in progress in the viciiiity of the 
bridge. Closing in, the several corps of my connnand took 
the direction of the burning bridge, and pushing forward 
reached, as quickly as practicable, the crest of a ridge over- 
looking the Shenandoah, and beyond it Port Republic vil- 
lage. 

The battle, which had taken place upon the further bank 
of the river, was wholly at an end. A single brigade sent 
forward by General Shields had been simply cut to pieces. 
Colonel Carroll, in command, had, for his own reasons, failed 
to burn the bridge, though occupying it in time with his 
guards. Jackson, hastening across, had fallen upon tlie in- 
ferior force, and the result yvas before us. 

Of the bridge nothing remained but the charred and 
smoking timbers. At the edge of the woods a body of the 
enemy's troops were in position, and a baggage-train was dis- 
appearing in a pass among the hills. Parties gathering the 
dead and wounded, together with a line of prisoners, awaiting 
the movements of the rebel force near by, was all in respect to 
troops of either side now to be seen. 

A parting salvo of carefully-aimed rilled guns, duly charged 
with shell, hastened the departure of the rebels, with their uu- 

LofC. ^ 



34 

lucky tliougli most gallant convoy, and the whole were speed- 
ily out of sight. 

My pontoon bridge having, of necessity, been left behind 
at Monnt Jackson to keep whole my line of communication 
and supply, measures were at once taken to construct a bridge 
out of such material as might be found at hand. Meantime 
Major Haskell of my staff was sent with a strong party of 
cavalry with orders to cross the river and find out what had 
become of General Shields. 

Proceeding rapidly down the river, and discovering on his 
way down bodies of the enemy, cavalry, infantry and artil- 
lery returning from the pursuit of Shields' troops, Major 
Haskell left his force concealed at a ford about seven miles 
below and crossed the river in rebel disguise, with a single at- 
tendant. After imminent risks in getting past parties or par- 
tisans of the enemy, he came up late at night with the remnant 
of Colonel Carroll's command, moving rapidly in the direction 
of Luray. 

From Colonel Carroll he learned that General Shields' 
corps was on its way to Richmond. Pushing forward. Major 
Haskell succeeded in finding General Shields' Assistant- 
Adjutant-General, by whom he was informed ^hat General 
Shields, with his whole force, was under immediate and im- 
perative orders for Pichmond, by way of Fredericksburg. 

Having executed his mission with his usual boldness and 
celerity, Major Haskell reached me toward morning with this 
report. The subjoined letters, all received within a few days 
following, from General Shields, more fully explain the cir- 
cumstances of Jackson's escape: 

Headquaeters Shields' Division, ) 
CoLTjMBiA Bridge, June 8th, 1862. \ 
61 P. M. 
Major- General J. C. Fremont : 

I pushed fonvarcl Colonel Carroll ^ath one brigade and fom- pieces of 
artillery, to move on Port Republic, to burn the bridge and check the ad- 
vance of the enemy. He went forward, I fear, imprudently, crossed the 
bridge, which is still standing, and drove the small force there defending 
it before him. Wliile pursuing this force, he was attacked Ity the enemy 
in force, lost two pieces of artillery, and is now in retreat to Conrad's 
Store. Part of the enemy it seems is on this side and part on the other 
side of the river. There is one brigade en route for Com'ad's Store from 



35 

this direction, and another brigade at this point, which I am moving for- 
ward to reinforce them in front. I will also order a fourth brigade, with 
the exception of one regiment, which I will leave at Luray to check Long- 
street, who is supposed to be in the mountains. I will earnestly lu-ge that 
you attack the enemy in their rear at once, with all your force, and will 
get my command up as quickly as possible to operate in front. There is 
no time to lose. 

JAS. SHIELDS, 

Major- General. 



Headquaktebs Shields' Division, ) 
Columbia Bridge, Jime 8th, 8.15 P. M. \ 
Major- General Fremont, 

Commanding U. S. Forces, Harrisonburg, Va. : 
The enemy, as you are aware, is on the Port Republic Road, with per- 
haps four or five of his brigades on this side of the river. If not attacked 
in force to-night, and hurled upon the river by your command, I a])prc- 
hend that he may pass the bridge during the night and then burn it, so 
that you could render me no assistance. If such be the case, having but 
two brigades in front, I might find it difiicult to resist him. Your only 
resource then would be to come round by way of New Market and cross 
the ferry at Columljia Bridge. If you are unable to employ your whole^ 
force sufficiently in his rear, I would respectfully suggest that a portion of 
it join me iu this Avay anyhow. 

JAS. SHIELDS, 

Major-General. 



Headquarters Shields' Division, ) 
Luray, June 12th, 1862. ( 
Major-General John C. Fremont, 

My advance guard was driven back on the 9th, after a sanguinary 
engagement of four hours. I reinforced it, and detennined in connection 
with you, to renew the attack next morning. After handing the dispatch 
to your messenger, a peremptory order reached me from Washington du-ect- 
ing me to get my command together and return at once to this point, 
preparatory to marching to Fredericksburg. I never obeyed an order with 
such reluctance, but no option was left me. Tlie mismanagement of one 
of my generals left the route open to Jackson. He faUed to burn the 
bridge at Port Republic according to orders, and the result has been the 
defeat of his small command and the escape of Jackson. Here I found 
ordA'- to remain imtil Banks is in position at Front Royal. The moment 
iie IS there I am to march to Catlet's Station to report to Fredericksburg, 
thence to Richmond. 

The cavalry attached to you, designated as Bayard's Cavalry, are to re- 
port to me. They must come to Front Royal. If I march before they 
reach me, they must join me at Catlet's, l)y way of Chester's Gap andWar- 
renton, 

I have the honor to be. 

Your friend and obedient servant, • 

JAS. SHIELDS, 
Major- General Commanding Division. 



36 

Witli the receipt of the intelligence brought by Major 
Haskell, I regarded the movement against Jackson as* closed. 
Whatever of the original objects of my mission I had been 
enabled to accomplish was now fairly fulfilled. That the 
retreat of the rebel leader had been conducted with skill and 
ability is what no just enemy can deny him. But had he 
been less favored by circumstances of weather, and by the 
absence of combinations beyond my control, though easy 
enough to have been made during Jackson's earlier pursuit, 
it is for consideration whether he would have been able even 
to reach the Shenandoah, and still less to cross that river, with 
or without a bridge to invite his transit. To what degree he 
had thus far been aifected by contact with my column, is 
manifest by his destruction of the valuable bridge he un 
molestedly passed, as well as by his rapid disappearance after 
rout of the operating force sent by General McDowell. 

The withdrawal of Shields had left my command an 
isolated body far in advance of all other troops, and all expec- 
tation of aid or concert of action with others was now cut off. 
My troops had been long without proper food or shelter; 
their march had been exhausting, and I had expended their 
last effort in reaching Port Republic. I determined, there- 
fore, to fall back at once upon my supplies, and accordingly, 
during a day of stormy rain, I marched my com'mand back 
to Harrisonbm-g. Here, in the evening of the 10th, I received 
the following telegram from the President, two days after the 
battle of Cross Keys : 

"Washington, June 9tli, 1863. 
Majar- General Fremont : 

Halt at Harrisonburg, pursuing .Jackson no further. Get your force 
well in hand, and stand on the defensive, guarding against a movement of 
the enemy back toward Strasburg or Franklin, and wait further orders, 
which will soon be sent you. 

A. LINCOLN. 

Harrisonburg, however strong in a strategical point of 
view for an army of larger proportions, was, to my small 
command, dangerous in the extreme. Distant twenty-two 
miles from the enemy's main railroad line at Staimton, and 



37 



approached by nine different roads, it left constantly exposed 
my lines of snpply and communication. 

For these reasons my ti'oops were, upon the 11th and 
12th, withdrawn to Mount Jackson, a position strongly defen- 
sible, lying behind the Shenandoah, and being a key to the 
surrounding country. 

In this movement the President acquiesced, in the follow- 
ing postscript to a telegram dated Washington, June 12th : 

Major- General Fremont : 

Yours preferring Mount Jackson to Harrisonburg is just received. On 
this point use your discretion, remembering that our object is to give such 
protection as you can to Western Vu-ginia. Many thanks to yourself, 
officers, and men, for the gallant battle of last Sunday. 

A. LINCOLN. 

On the 13th General AYhiting's Division, including 
Hampton's and Hood's Brigades, arrived at Staunton. 

At Mount Jackson a rest was had for several days. 

After what has been already stated relative to the condi- 
tion in which a large portion of my command were turned 
over to me from the Potomac, as Avell as concerning hardsliip 
and exposure endured by all, it is almost superfluous to pursue 
the subject further. From the continued want of transporta- 
tion, but a very limited amount of supplies had been got 
forward since leaving Petersburg. Some corn-meal and flour, 
which the rebels, in their haste, proved unable to carry away 
from Mount Jackson, had been seized and issued to the 
troops. 

Mills also in which the above were found, and which the 
enemy had not time to fire, were set at work and eked out a 
scanty supply. Farther than this, added to fresh beef ob- 
tained, or driven along upon the hoof, it is difiicult, at this 
moment, to say what constituted the subsistence of my com- 
mand after the five days' partial rations found at Petersburg 
became exhausted. It was reported, almost in remonstrance, 
by General Bayard, in regard to both men and animals, that 
the cavalry should never have been sent forward as they were 
at Harrisonburg — " the horses staggering in the ranks from 
exhaustion, and the men having been without rations, other 



88 

than fresh beef, for two or three days." On the evening of 
the 7th, precedmg the battle of Cross Keys, it was ascertained 
that less than one full ration in an}^ form remained for issue ; 
and it was only upon the certainty of a fight the next day 
tliat the council assemljled decided for my plan to move for- 
ward. These circumstances cannot but go forcibly to illus- 
trate the physical condition of my men four days after 
Cross Keys, on their return to Mount Jackson. It was, in- 
deed, less a matter of surprise that their fatigues and privations 
had begun unmistakably to tell upon the most robust, than 
that the mass had been got forward at all. More than two 
hundred had up to this time — after careful exandnation by a 
board of surgeons — been dischai'ged for disabilities incident to 
their hard service ; while of the remaining sick and wounded, 
brought along mostly in army wagons, owing to want of am- 
bulances, upward of one thousand were now at Mount Jack- 
son. The hospitals were full, and I was even deficient m the 
necessary medicines as well as the requisite number of surgeons 
to give attendance. 

The heroism, the imcomplaining patience, with which the 
soldiers of my command endured the starvation and other 
bodily sufterings of their extended marches, added to their 
never-fiiiling alacrity for duty against the enemy, entitled them 
to my gratitude and respect. 

For their good conduct on the march and in the field, I 
take this opportunity to thank them, as well as their otiicers, 
regretting that, within the limits of this report, I cannot dwell 
upon the many signal cases of individual merit that came 
under my notice. 

The conduct of such of my staft' oflicers as were permitted 
by their duties to be present during the numerous affairs and 
skirmishes taking place in the pursuit U]> the Shenandoah 
Yalley, and especially their energy and promptness on the 
occasion of the battle at Cross Keys, merits, without exception, 
my warmest commendation. 

To the ofiicers generally of my staif, I take pleasure in 
making my thanks. They are entitled to the most honorable 
mention I can make for the gallantry, loyalty, and capacity 




that specially qualified them for the responsible duties which 
they discharged with courage and fidelity. And particularly, 
though it is almost unjust to make any distinction, I desire to 
present to the notice of the Government, for meritorious ser- 
vice during the campaign, Captains J. R. Howard, E. W. 
Raymond, and G. W. Nichols, among the younger, and 
Colonels Albert Tracy, Anselm Albert, Charles Zagonyi, and 
Lieut.-Col. John Pilsen, among the elder officers. To the four 
last mentioned I feel specially bound to. record personally, 
also, my acknowledgments. Their uncommon professional 
ability, joined to their previous long experience in the field, 
rendered their services of the greatest value to me throughout 
a very laborious and hazardous campaign. 

All but two of the staff ofiicers present ^vith the command 
during the engagements are now out of the army, havino' 
either resigned or been mustered out. Doubtless, however, 
some just form of recognition of past services would be grate- 
ful to them, even at this day. 

My Chief Quartermaster in the field, Captain Goulding, as 
also my Chief of Subsistence, Captain Mallory, performed 
each his duties with energy and ability. My Medical-Director 
in the field, Surgeon George Suckley, never failing in zeal and 
activity in the mass of labors crowding upon him, stands 
entitled to my earnest commendation and thanks. I would 
also name as most worthy and efficient in his duties, Brigade- 
Surgeon and Medical-Inspecter A. C. Ilamlin. 

Major Clary, Chief Quartermaster at Department Head- 
quarters at AVheeling, and Major Darr, Provost-Marshal-Gen- 
eral, rendered at all times zealous and efficient services during 
the period of my command in the Mountain Department. 

Significant demonstrations of the enemy, who had been 
reported largely reinforced, taken in connection with the still 
isolated position at Mount Jackson, induced my farther with- 
drawal down the valley to Strasburg, and subsequently to Mid- 
dletown, wliere I arrived with my command June 24th, eflect- 
ing a junction with the forces of Generals Banks and Sigel. 

The tents and baggage left at Petersburg on the 27th of 
May having been brought forward to Middletown, and camps 



40 

and hospitals established at healthful points — having due re- 
gard to positions of defense — the troops of my command 
were made comparatively comfortable, and the sick began to 
improve. For the first time since they had started on the 
campaign the men here received full rations. 

While thus occupied in preparing my corps for active ser- 
vice, which telegrams from the War Department were pre- 
paring me immediately to expect, I received from the Secre- 
tary of War the President's order of June 26th, which placed 
my own and the corps then with me under the command of 
Major-General Pope. 

Having the coni'iction tliat, consistently with a just regard 
for the safety of my troops, and with what was rightfully due 
to my personal honor, I could not suifer myself to pass under 
the command of General Pope, I asked to be relieved from 
the duty to which I had been assigned under him. On the 
27th of June, having been relieved of my command by direc- 
tion of the President, I proceeded to Xew York to await 
further orders. 

Respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

J. C. FREMONT, 

Late Major-Gcneral U. S. Army. 



In connection with others especially alluded to, the fol- 
lowing telegrams, extracts, reports, ifcc, gleaned from private 
memoranda of myself or members of my stafi", and num- 
bered from 1 to 30, are appended to the foregoing report 
of operations in the Mountain Department. It is not unlikely 
that dispatches received from the President may be also on 
file at the War Office. I will ask, however, to have his own 
included with the rest, as they serve to make clearer points 
presented. 

I would here add that for the topographical map of Cross 
Keys, forwarded with report, I am indebted to my late Chief 
of Artillery, Lieut.-Col. Pilsen. 

J. c. frEmois^t, 

Late Major-General U. S. Army. 

New York, N. Y., Dec. 31st, 1865. 




m 




